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INTRODUCTION

On February 1, 1988, the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1988 went into effect.' The most far reaching aspect of that
Agreement is the Job Opportunity and Benefit Security (JOBS) provision contained in Article II. The Article II JOBS provision appears
on its face to be a radical new concept in the preservation of job
opportunities and benefits for the members of the United Mine
Workers of America (hereinafter "UMWA"). Upon reflection, however, it is clear that the Article II JOBS provision is not so much
a revolutionary event as it is the result of evolution driven by collective bargaining and case law developed over the past two decades.
In order to fully understand and appreciate the Article II JOBS
provision, it is necessary to understand this history. The tracing of
this history, therefore, is one of the purposes of this article.
In spite of its evolutionary development, Article II is a lengthy,
complex and detailed provision which will demand application in
various factual contexts. At its inception numerous issues were identified which would affect the future scope and application of Article
II. The passage of time has given rise to additional issues. A second
purpose of this Article, therefore, will be to review and analyze those
issues. 2
II.

A.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF ARTICLE II

Background

The Article II JOBS provision may be characterized as the culmination of nearly two decades of activity by the UMWA directed
at job preservation and job acquisition. To fully appreciate this history, two preliminary matters must be addressed. The first is that
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements have been periodically

1. National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1988, art. 1, at 1 (1988) [hereinafter 1988
Agreement].
2. The restrictions on the contracting out of certain types of work (e.g., transportation of
coal; repair of equipment) as opposed to the leasing, subleasing or licensing out of coal mines and
coal reserves, is covered by different provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement,
and is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., NLRB v. Int'l Union, UMWA, 727 F.2d 954 (10th
Cir. 1984) (involving legality of Article I A(g)(2) of 1978 Agreement regarding contracting out of
repair and maintenance work).
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negotiated between the International Union, United Mine Workers
of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association
("BCOA").3 In this article, the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreements negotiated in 1971, 1974, 1978, 1981, 1984, and 1988,
will be referred to.
The second preliminary matter is of greater than simply historical
significance. It involves the distinction between coal mining operations and coal lands. Beyond certain obvious examples, no "bright
line" test has developed which can be applied in every instance to
determine whether a particular asset constitutes an "operation" or
"coal lands." Generally speaking, and for purposes of this article,
producing active coal mines, preparation plants and the like are
considered "operations," and virgin coal reserves which have never
been mined upon are considered "coal lands." ' 4 It is within this
analytical framework that the provisions of prior National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements will be analyzed.
B.

Prior NationalAgreements
1. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971

Nearly twenty years ago the 1971 National Agreement contained
only a single provision related to the protection or creation of job
rights at new or newly acquired operations, or on coal lands held
by a signatory Employer.5 This provision stated as follows:
As part of the consideration for this agreement, the Employers agree that this
agreement covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal
preparation facilities owned or held under lease by them, or any of them, or by
any subsidiary or affiliate at the date of this agreement, or acquired during its
term which may hereafter (during the term of this agreement) be put into production or use. The Employers agree that they will not lease, license or contract

3. UMWA by Rabbit v. Nobel, 720 F. Supp. 1169 (V.D. Pa. 1989), affirmed, No. 89-3734
(3d Cir. April 9, 1990) (unpublished).
4. Numerous factors may be considered in determining whether a particular asset constitutes
an "operation" or "coal lands" under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. The discussion
of such issues is beyond the scope of this article.
5. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971, art. II, § (d), at 4 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Agreement].
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out any coal lands, coal producing or coal preparation facilities for the purpose
of avoiding the application of this agreement or any section, paragraph or clause
thereof.6

This provision actually contained two different obligations. First,
it contained a blanket requirement that any new or newly acquired
operation be covered by the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement as soon as it was "put into production or use." As will be
discussed below, this language was later deemed to be too broad to
withstand legal challenge.
The second aspect of this provision of the 1971 Agreement is
that it constitutes an attempt to control subsequent leasing, licensing
and contracting out of coal lands or "coal producing or coal preparation facilities" (i.e., operations), by prohibiting such transactions
when done for the purpose of avoiding the terms of the 1971 Agreement.
The 1971 Agreement contained no restrictions on an Employer's
right to permanently transfer operations or coal lands; and it contained
no provision regarding leasing, licensing, or contracting out engaged
in for other than the purpose of avoiding the 1971 Agreement.
2. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974
7
On December 6, 1974, the 1974 Agreement went into effect. It
contained significant new provisions restricting the transfer, leasing,
subleasing or licensing out of certain coal related assets.
a.

The Successorship Clause

Perhaps the most significant provision added in the 1974 Agreement was the Article I Successorship Clause. It has continued to be
in every National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement since,' and provides in pertinent part:
6. Id.
7. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974, art. I, at 1 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 Agreement].
8. Language was added in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1984, requiring
notice to the UMWA of transactions covered by the Successorship Clause.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/6

4

Meisburg: Article II of the National
Bituminous
ARTICLE
II Coal Wage Agreement of 1988
1990]

In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer
promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, conveyed,
or otherwise transferred or assigned to any successor without first securing the
agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obligations under this Agreement. Provided that the Employer shall not be the guarantor or be held liable
for any breach by the successor or assignee of its obligations, and the UMWA
will look exclusively to the successor or assignee for compliance with the terms
of this Agreement. 9

This provision was added primarily as a result of the development
of a rule under federal labor law, that a labor contract, and even
the duty to recognize and bargain with the Union, did not necessarily
survive the transfer of the assets of a business from one owner to
another. 0
There are a number of important aspects to the Successorship
Clause. For purposes of this article, two are particularly important.
First, by its own terms, the Successorship Clause applies only to the
permanent disposition of an operation that is, a sales, conveyance,
assignment or transfer. It does not apply to leases and licenses,
which require an ongoing relationship.11
The second important aspect to the Successorship Clause is that
2
it applies to the permanent disposition of operations, not coal lands.1
The purpose of the Successorship Clause is to protect the job rights
of employees at an operation in the event of its disposition by their
Employer. Thus, a transferror Employer must require its transferee
to undertake the Employer's obligations under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement at the transferred operation. However, where there are no employees, there is no "operation" subject
to the Successorship Clause. 3
9. 1974 Agreement, art. I, at 1.
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, (1987).
11. Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545, 553 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S. Ct.
1349 (1981); see Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872, 885-86 (3d Cir. 1980) (assuming application
of Successorship Clause to permanent dispositions).
12. E.g., BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. District 30, UMWA, Local 5741, 714 F. Supp. 260 (E.D.
Ky. 1988).
13. Id.; UMWA v. U.S. Steel Mining Co., 636 F. Supp. 151 (D. Utah 1986), affl'd, 895 F.2d
698 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Chateaugay Corp., 891 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Kaiser Steel Corp.,
106 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); see Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d at 886, n.12 (Successorship Clause cannot apply until coal lands are put into production by employees).
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For the most part, the Successorship Clause has been applied to
the disposition of active coal mines. More recently, however, questions have arisen as to whether it applies to the disposition of a
permanently closed coal mine. 14 And, as noted above, because the

Successorship Clause applies only to operations, it is clear that it
does not apply to the transfer of coal lands, nor does it apply to

transactions other than permanent transfers. 5 Thus, the Successorship Clause has no effect on either the transfer of coal lands, or
on the leasing or licensing of coal lands.
b.

Leasing and Licensing Out Clause

The Leasing and Licensing Out Clause contained in the 1974
Agreement provided as follows:
The Employers agree that they will not lease, sublease or license out any coal
lands, coal producing or coal preparation facilities where the purpose thereof is
to avoid the application of this Agreement or any section, paragraph or clause
thereof.
Licensing out of coal mining operations on coal lands owned or held under lease
or sublease by any signatory operator hereto shall not be permitted unless the
work involved is performed by members of the United Mine Workers of America
in the manner and to the extent permitted by law and that the licensing out does
not cause or result in the layoff of Employees of the Employer: provided, however, that either the licensor or licensee, lessee or sublessee makes the appropriate
payments provided by this Agreement to the United Mine Workers of America
Health and Retirement Fund and otherwise abide by the terms of this Agreement.1 6

It will be recognized that the first paragraph of this new provision
was taken almost verbatim from the Coal Lands Clause contained
in the 1971 Agreement.1 7 The second paragraph Article IA(h) was
14. UMWA v. U.S. Steel Mining Co., 636 F. Supp. 151; In re Chateaugay Corp., 891 F.2d
1034; In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 106 Bankr. 669.
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. 1974 Agreement, supra note 7, at 6.
17. The Coal Lands Clause of the 1971 Agreement continued in the 1974 Agreement, but
without the last sentence which, with the change discussed below, now became first paragraph of
Article II(h). The language used in the 1971 Agreement referred to leasing, licensing and contracting
out. In the 1974 Agreement the language had been changed to refer to leasing, subleasing and licensing
out. The change may reflect that in the 1974 Agreement there first appeared restrictions on contracting
and subcontracting certain jobs generally performed in and around coal mines (e.g., transportation
of coal; repair and maintenance of equipment). See n.2 above. The fact that this type of contracting
was now (and continues to be) covered under a separate provision of the Agreement may explain the
change. In any event, there is no controlling authority under the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement to suggest that the contracting out of coal mines or coal lands is not covered under the
"licensing out" language.
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entirely new, and restricted contracting out ("licensing out")18 of

"coal mining operations" (emphasis added) to those contractors who
employed members of the United Mine Workers of America, and
who would make payments to certain pension and benefit trust funds
which were also created by the 1974 Agreement. As discussed below,
this language was also too broad to withstand later legal challenge.
The addition of the Successorship Clause and the Leasing and
Licensing Out Clause attempted to cure the deficiencies which had
been left open by the 1971 Agreement. Specifically, the Successorship Clause now provided for restrictions on the permanent disposition of coal mining operations, while the Leasing and Licensing
Out Clause both continued the restrictions on the leasing and licensing out of coal lands and operations, where the purpose is to
avoid the Agreement; and added restrictions on the licensing out of
operations which resulted in the layoff of an Employer's employees,
and required the licensee to hire UMWA members and make payments to the UMWA funds. However, the 1974 Agreement still did
not address the licensing out or the sale (or other permanent disposition) of coal lands.
3. Litigation During the Term of 1978 Agreement
Each of the noted provisions of the 1974 Agreement was continued into the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1978.
However, during the term of the 1978 Agreement, litigation ensued
which forced a modification of the Coal Lands Clause, as well as
the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause.
There were two cases arising during the term of the 1978 Agreement, 19 resulting from independent bargaining engaged in by the
UMWA and Amax Coal Company, and by the UMWA and Lone
Star Steel Company. These two companies, in bargaining with the
UMWA, raised protests against the UMWA's bargaining proposals,
including the Successorship Clause, the Leasing and Licensing Out
Clause and the Coal Lands Clagse.
18. See supra note 17.
19. Amax, 614 F.2d at 872; Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 545.
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a. The Coal Lands.Clause
In both Amax and Lone Star, the company contended that the
Coal Lands Clause was a non-mandatory subject of bargaining and
that, therefore, the Union could not strike or otherwise coerce the
company in an effort to require collective bargaining over it.2 Under
the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA"), an employer is only required to bargain with a union on behalf of "the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes." 21 The companies
argued that the language of the Coal Lands Clause was so broad
that it effectively constituted bargaining beyond the unit for which
the UMWA was authorized to bargain. When the UMWA struck
and otherwise insisted on such broad language, the companies argued, it violated Section 8(b)(3) of the NRLA which provides in
pertinent part:
... It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
.. to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a).2

Both the Third Circuit 23 and the Tenth Circuit24 agreed with the
position of the companies generally on the grounds that to compel
bargaining over the Coal Lands Clause, which required the blanket
application of the Agreement to operations newly acquired or initiated during its term, would require negotiations "on a basis broader
than the certified unit." ' 25 The UMWA had argued that this was
necessary in order to discourage Employers from shifting production
to newly developed or newly acquired operations, thereby avoiding
the costs of the Agreement. Both of the Circuit Courts stated, in
identical language, that the wording of the Coal Lands Clause was

20. Amax, 614 F.2d at 883; Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 550.
21. National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (emphasis added). A bargaining
unit is the term of art for the group of employees on whose behalf the union may be authorized to
bargain. Simply put, a unit consists of a defined group of employees who share sufficient common

interests so as to make their group representation by a union appropriate. Of course, a majority of
the employees in a unit must have first freely chosen to be represented by a union.
22. Id. at § 158(b)(3). Section 8(b)(3).
23. Amax, 614 F.2d at 872.
24. Lone Star, 639 F.2d 545. The Lone Star decision did not address the Leasing and Licensing
Out Clause.
25. Amax, 614 F.2d at 883.
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"much broader than necessary to accomplish" this goal, 26 because
it required "the agreement to be put into effect in toto elsewhere,

including the non-economic provisions that have no bearing on unit
employees. "27
b.

The Leasing and Licensing Out Clause

In Amax, the company contended that the Leasing and Licensing

Out Clause violated Section 8(e) of the NLRA,2 and that the UMWA
violated Section 8(b)(3) 29 by striking and otherwise insisting on this

language.
Section 8(e) generally prohibits a union and an employer from
entering into a contract which requires the employer to cease doing
business with any other person.30 A clause which facially violates
Section 8(e) may nevertheless be legal if it serves an interest of the
unit employees, such as the preservation of unit work or mainte-

nance of work standards. 3' The Leasing and Licensing Out Clause
would require the company not to do business, or to cease doing

26. Id; Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 558.
27. Id.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). Section 8(e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter
into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains
or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such
an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void ....
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. In addition, Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act, provides in pertinent part:
...
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (i) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii)
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by section 8(e) ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(A), specifically prohibits a union from engaging in strikes or other coercive activity
in an effort to achieve a contract which violates 8(e). Section 8(b)(4)(A).
30. Id., e.g., National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
31. Id.
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business, with any licensee which refused to hire, or continue to
hire, UMWA members, and to make payments to the UMWA funds.
There was no requirement that the licensee hire unit members, which
perhaps would arguably preserve unit work or unit work standards3 2
The company, therefore, argued that the proposed clause was in
violation of Section 8(e).
The Third Circuit agreed. The requirement that any licensed out
work be performed only by contractors which hired UMWA members and paid the UMWA funds served only the UMWA's organizing interests, and the interests of UMWA members generally. The
Third Circuit held that because the clause would require the company not to do business with a licensee which refused to comply
with the hiring requirements, it violated Section 8(e). 33
Eventually, the Amax and Lone Star decisions resulted in modification of the Coal Lands Clause and the Leasing and Licensing
Out Clause as those provisions appeared in the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1981 . 4
4. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1981
As a result of the Amax and Lone Star litigation, language in
the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause, stating in effect that an employer could only use contractors who hired members of the UMWA,
and requiring payments to the UMWA funds, was removed. The
resulting Leasing and Licensing Out Clause, found at Article IA(h)
of the 1981 Agreement, stated as follows:
The Employers agree they will not lease, sublease or license out any coal lands,
coal producing or coal preparation facilities where the purpose thereof is to avoid
the application of this Agreement or any section, paragraph or clause thereof.
Licensing out of coal mining operations on coal lands owned or held under lease
or sublease by any signatory operator hereto shall not be permitted unless the
licensing out does not cause or result in the layoff of Employees of the Employer."1

32. Amax, 614 F.2d at 887.
33. Id.
34. Because neither the Amax nor Lone Star decisions required its amendment, the Successorship
Clause remained (and remains) in tact.
35. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1981, art. IA § h at 6 (1981) [hereinafter
1981 Agreement].
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The other major result of the Amax and Lone Star cases was
the removal of the language from the Coal Lands Clause, which
had automatically applied the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement to any coal lands, coal producing or coal preparation
facilities initiated or acquired and put into production or use during
the term of an Agreement. Instead, the language was changed to
read as follows (new language in italics):
As part of the consideration for this Agreement, the Employers agree that this

Agreement covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal
preparation facilities owned or held under lease by them, or any of them, or by
any subsidiary or affiliate at the date of this Agreement, or acquired during its

term which may hereafter (during the term of this Agreement) be put into production or use. This section will immediately apply to any new operations upon
the Union's recognition, certification, or otherwise properly obtaining bargaining

rights. Notwithstandingthe foregoing, the terms of this Agreement shall be applied
rewithout evidence of Union representation of the Employees involved to any
6
location of an operation already covered by the terms of the Agreement.

Thus, the offending language in the Coal Lands Clause was cured
by the addition of a requirement that the UMWA obtain bargaining
rights as a precondition for applying the Agreement at any new or
newly acquired operation, except where the new or acquired operation was actually the relocation of an existing operation which
37
had been covered by the Agreement.
The deletion of the language from the Leasing and Licensing
Out Clause, and the addition of the language to the Coal Lands
Clause, severely restricted the UMWA's ability to add to its membership rolls by the acquisition of work performed at any new or
newly acquired coal mine, or at the operations initiated or licensed
out to contractors. Indeed, a signatory Employer was now free to
initiate a new coal mine without automatically applying the Agreement, and to license out operations to a contractor irrespective of
whether it had an agreement with the UMWA or whether it employed UMWA members.
36. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
37. A later challenge to the Coal Lands Clause of the 1978 Agreement, based on a claim that
it violated section 8(e) of the Act (discussed above) was rejected on the grounds, inter alia, of the
UMWA's agreement in bargaining that such requirement was already implied in the language of the
clause.
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These changes in language, coupled with the decline of coal prices
in the early 1980's, set the stage for a dramatic increase in the utilization of contractors. This is illustrated by two Fourth Circuit cases
involving Clinchfield Coal Company. 38 In those cases, the issue was
whether the company was permitted under the language of the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause of the 1981 Agreement, to license out
coal lands at the same time employees at company mines were on
layoff.

39

In the wake of a downturn in demand, Clinchfield idled a number of its mines, and laid-off several hundred employees. It retained
in service, however, a number of contractors to which it had licensed
out coal lands. The Union claimed that the operations initiated by
these contractors were providing coal which could have been provided by the idled company mines, and that the continued utilization
of contractors while company mines were idle violated the prohibition of the portion of the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause which
states that "[l]icensing out of coal mining operations ... shall not

be permitted unless the licensing out. does not cause or result in the
layoff of the Employees of the Employer." ' 40 Essentially, the UMWA's argument was that to the extent contractors continued to provide coal to the company, the licensing out continued, and therefore
"caused," the preexisting layoffs at the company mines which could
have produced the coal. Therefore, the UMWA argued, the licensing
out was forbidden under the second sentence of the Leasing and
4
Licensing Out Clause. 1
The UMWA prosecuted grievances to this effect and the company responded with two arguments in each case. First, the company
stated it had only licensed out coal lands, not operations, so that
the second sentence of Leasing and Licensing Out Clause by its terms
did not apply. 42 Second, the company argued that the licensing out
38. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. UMWA Dist. 28, 556 F. Supp 522 (W.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 720
F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1983); and Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, UMWA, 1098, 567 F. Supp. 1431
(W.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1984).
39. Id.
40. Supra note 35.

41. The first sentence of the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause, which covered both coal lands
as well as coal preparation and coal producing facilities, was not an issue in the Clinchfield cases.
42. Clinchfield, 567 F. Supp. at 1431.
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of coal lands had occurred months, and in some cases years, before
the 1982 layoffs. It therefore argued that the licensing out of the
lands could not have proximately caused the layoffs, as required by
43
the language of the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause.
The case was eventually decided on the basis of these two issues.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the vacation of the two arbitration awards
which had gone in favor of the Union, ruling first that the arbitrators had ignored the fact that the Clause's language at issue applied only to the term "operations," and had instead applied that
provision to the contracting out of coal lands. 44 Second, the court
ruled the Clause only prohibits licensing out which is the proximate
cause of a layoff, and that the layoffs had not been "proximately
caused" by the licensing out.45 Thus, the Clinchfield litigation served
to demonstrate the limits of the 1981 Agreement's job protection
provisions.
5. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1984
As at least a partial response to the Amax, Lone Star and Clinchfield decisions, the UMWA and the BCOA added new requirements
46
to the Leasing and Licensing Out Clause in the 1984 Agreement.
It is these provisions, which are the antecedent of many of the provisions of the Article II JOBS provision in the 1988 Agreement. 47

43. Id.

44. Id. at 1433.
45. Id.
46. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1984, art. IA, § h at 8 (1984) [hereinafter

1984 Agreement].
47. Article IA(h)(2)-(7) provided:
(2)For purposes of lawfully preserving and protecting job opportunities for the Employees
working or laid off from a particular operation covered by this Agreement, and to assure
that work opportunities are not eliminated by lease or license arrangements, the Employer
agrees that it will not lease, sublease, or license out coal mining operations which at any

time were in operation by that Employer and covered by this Agreement, unless the conditions set forth in the following paragraph are satisfied:
Leasing, subleasing or licensing out of coal mining operations covered by this Agreement
shall be permitted where the lessee-licensee agrees that all offers of employment by such

lessee-licensee shall first be made (on the basis of mine seniority) to the Employer's classified
and laid-off Employees at the mine who have not secured regular employment at Any other
operation of the Employer covered by this Agreement, if such employment at the leased,

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

13

West Virginia
Review, Vol.
4 [1990], Art. 6
WESTLaw
VIRGINIA
LA92,
WIss.
REVIEW

[Vol. 92

Generally speaking, Article IA(h)(2)-(7) stated that an Employer could
only lease, sublease or license certain operations if the lessee, sublessee or licensee agreed to make all offers of employment first to
48
the Employer's active and laid-off employees at that operation.
Thus, unlike the prior Leasing and Licensing Out Clause deemed
unlawful in Amax, Article IA(h)(2)-(7) did not appear to be directed
at benefiting the UMWA or UMWA members generally, but at protecting the jobs (or job opportunities) of unit employees, i.e., those
persons actively employed at or laid-off from a particular operation
of the Employer. 49

Article IA(h)(2)-(7) obviously provided a greater measure of protection with respect to the leasing and licensing out of coal mining
operations, similar to that provided by the Successorship Clause.
One very important difference, however, is that the Successorship

subleased or licensed out operation is for jobs of the nature covered by this Agreement,
and if such Employees are qualified for such jobs. The lessee-licensee shall not be required
to make more than one such offer of employment to each such Employee.
(3) Acceptance or rejection of such an offer of employment made by a lessee-licensee or
any personnel action between Employee and lessee-licensee shall not affect such Employee's
panel rights with the Employer as established by this Agreement.
(4) Any dispute regarding the rights of Employees secured by subsection (2) above shall be
resolved between the prior Employer and the Employee under Article XXIII of this Agreement. The Employer agrees that it will reserve in any lease, sublease or license subject to
this section the ability of the Employer to remedy any finding as to noncompliance of an
Employee's right to be considered for employment opportunity as provided herein.
(5) The prior Employer shall not be a guarantor or be held liable for any breach by the
lessee-licensee of its hiring or bargaining obligations or the terms of any agreement between
the Union and the lessee-licensee.
(6) Within ten (10) days after the lease, sublease or licensing out of any coal producing or
coal preparation facilities, but in any event prior to the time that any classified work commences, the Employer shall provide notice thereof to the appropriate District President.
Such notice shall disclose the identity of all parties to the transaction, the location of the
facilities affected thereby, and the identity of the coal producing or coal preparation facilities
affected thereby.
(7) These provisions (Article IA(h)(2) through (6) shall not be construed to diminish any
rights of Employees or the Union established any other provision of this Agreement, including but not limited to the successorship clause or Article IA(h)(1).
48. Id.

49. Id. It should be noted that during the term of the 1984 Agreement, there were no court
challenges to the legality of the various provisions of Article IA(h)(2)-(7).
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Clause requires a successor to accept the Employer's obligations under the Agreement, while Article IA(h)(2)-(7) only required the offering of jobs. However, neither the Successorship Clause nor Article
IA(h)(2)-(7) applied to transactions involving coal lands.50
The significance of this "gap" in coverage is highlighted by a
case which arose during the term of the 1984 Agreement. The UMWA
presented a series of grievances challenging the fact that the company
had not included a Successorship Clause in the lease of certain coal
lands to an independent operator. One arbitrator accepted UMWA's
argument that the Successorship Clause applies to the leasing of coal
lands, despite the fact that the Successorship Clause only mentions
operations, and despite the fact that the Successorship Clause applies
to only permanent dispositions of operations, and not to leases. 51
BethEnergy filed an action in federal court to set aside the arbitrator's award on the grounds that the arbitrator had ignored the
plain language of the Successorship Clause.5 2 The court held that
the arbitrator's award failed to draw its essence from the 1984
Agreement because the arbitrator ignored the clear meaning of the
term "operations" when he applied the Successorship Clause to the
leasing of coal lands.53
6.

The Employment and Economic Security Pact of 1987

In the spring of 1987, the United Mine Workers of America and
Island Creek Corporation announced the attainment of the 1987
Employment and Economic Security Pact ("the EESP"). 4 The EESP
contained job security provisions similar to those found in the Article II JOBS Provision. However, the EESP also contained a number of features not found in Article II. For example, under the

50. Likewise, the Coal Lands Clause did not (and does not) apply to the Agreement to coal
lands per se, but to "the operation of ... the coal lands." See Amax, 614 F.2d at 886 n.12.

51. BethEnergy Corp. and UMWA, Dist. 30, Local Union 5741, NO. 84-30-86-229 (November
24, 1986)(Render, Arb.)

52. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Dist. 30, UMWA, 714 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
53. Id. at 261.

54. The Employment and Economic Security Pact (1987) [hereinafter EESP], as announced in
United Mine Workers Journal, April, 1987 at 11.
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EESP, an employer was to hire first from its own laid off employees,
and then hire from a "hiring hall" of UMWA members, whose
names would be furnished to the employer by the UMWA.5 5 The
dubious legality of this hiring hall concept was never tested.
In a manner reminiscent of the Coal Lands Clause prior to its
modification after the 1978 Agreement, the EESP also sought to
declare all new or newly acquired operations an "accretion" to the
bargaining unit of an employer's existing mines.5 6 As a fallback position, in order to save the provision from the same type of illegality
discussed in Amax, the EESP contained a neutrality pledge. Essentially it required the Employer to declare its neutrality in any organizing campaign among the employees of any new or newly
acquired operation which could not legally be accreted to the existing
57
bargaining unit of the Employer.
The EESP also contained a provision requiring any lessee or
licensee engaged by an Employer to have labor costs no less than
those imposed under the EESP 8 This provision is also reminiscent
of the Coal Lands Clause, in its attempt to remove any incentive
that an employer might have to utilize sources of production rather
than its existing, signatory coal mines. In both Amax and Lone Star,
the Coal Lands Clause was found defective because of its requisite
imposition of a entire collective bargaining agreement, including its
non-economic terms, making the clause much broader than necessary
for any legal purpose. In the EESP, the language was tailored to
require only comparability in aggregate labor costs, thus avoiding
the facial legal invalidity of the earlier Coal Lands Clause.
The EESP also contained a commitment to be bound by the
successor national agreement reached in bargaining between the
55. EESP, para. (A)(4)(b) of Addendum A.
56. EESP, para. (A)(5) of Addendum A. The question of collective bargaining agreement pro-

visions which "accrete" new or newly acquired facilities to an existing bargaining unit may present
complex questions of not only contract construction, but federal labor policy. See, e.g., Pullman
Indus., Inc., 159 NLRB 580 (1966); Commonwealth Gas Co., 218 NLRB 857 (1975).
57. EESP, para. (A)(6) of Addendum A.
58. EESP, para. (B)(2)(c) of Addendum A. Union standards clauses are designed to remove

the incentive for contracting out bargaining unit work by requiring that the aggregate labor costs of
the contractor are not less than those of the signatory employer. When limited to that purpose they
generally are legal. E.g., Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
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UMWA and the BCOA (i.e., the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1988). However, at the UMWA's option, the EESP
job opportunity provisions would be carried forward and applicable
during the term of the successor national agreement, irrespective of
its contents.5 9
Interestingly, in the prefatory language of the portion of the
EESP relating to employment opportunity and job security, the parties identified a number of potential issues underlying their agreement. Included in that prefatory language were two clauses which
were highly instructive:
WHEREAS, the mining and production of coal involves, by its very nature, the
depletion of resources at one location and thus, the continual relocation of bargaining unit work to other locations; and
WHEREAS, the economic reality of today's coal market has prompted consideration by the industry of a wide range of alternative mining arrangements which
threaten the loss of bargaining unit jobs; ... w

In language that is less than direct, these two clauses admit of
the UMWA's concern regarding the non-coverage of coal lands under prior National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements, and the
"economic reality" which was forcing employers to utilize sources
of production, such as new coal mines and contract mine operators,
which were not covered by, or signatory to, UMWA collective bar6
gaining agreements. '

III.

ARTICLE

II JOBS PRoVIsION

The Article II JOBS provision covers a number of issues which
relate more or less to employment opportunity. 62 Among other things,
the Article II JOBS provision establishes a training and education
fund . 63 This is a trust fund to which signatory Employers have con-

59. The EESP also contained a number of other provisions which are not immediately germane

to an analysis of the history of the Article II JOBS provision (e.g., a most favored nations clause,
an employer pledge not to reorganize its enterprise, etc.).
60. EESP at 3.
61. The prefatory language contained in the Article II JOBS provision reprises the "depletion

of resources" language, but does not contain the "economic reality" language.
62. The full text of Article II is set out as an Appendix to this article.
63. 1988 Agreement, Art. II, § E, at 17.
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tributed four cents an hour for each hour of classified work performed during the first two years of the 1988 Agreement, and will
contribute five cents an hour during the last three years of the 1988
Agreement. The purpose of this trust fund is to provide financial
assistance for training or education to unemployed UMWA members, and heir family dependents, who are seeking employment opportunities in the coal industry, in coal-related industries, or in any
other vocation, trade or employment.64
Article II also establishes a skills training program at each mining
facility covered by the 1988 Agreement. 6 The purpose of the skills
training program is to assist active employees by enhancing their
existing skills, or by developing new skills, so that miners will be
adapted to new machinery and to improved technology introduced
at the mine. 66 Thesd training and education provisions of Article II
are a positive and creative response to the very real needs of miners
to broaden and improve their job skills.
By far the most comprehensive and well publicized provisions
of Article II, however, are those that relate directly to job rights
at nonsignatory operations, or at the operations of lessees and licensees. Of particular importance is that the requirements of Article
II apply to both operations as well as the development of coal lands
held by an Employer. It is these requirements of Article II upon
which the remainder of this article will focus.
A.

Basic Provisions of Article II
The Article II JOBS provision is lengthy and complex, covering
nearly eight pages in the 1988 Agreement. Boiled down to its essence,
however, the job opportunity provisions of Article II may be summarized as follows.
Article II(A)(1) provides as follows:
. . . [Tihe first three out of every five new job openings for work of a nature
covered by this Agreement at any existing, new, or newly acquired non-signatory

64. Id.
65. 1988 Agreement at 10.
66. Id.
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bituminous coal operation of the Employer shall be filled by classified laid-off
Employees on the panels of the Employer's operations covered by this Agree-

ment. 6

With respect to lessees and licensees, Article II(B)(2) provides:
Leasing, subleasing, or licensing out of [bituminous coal] lands or operations shall
be permitted where the lessee-licensee agrees in writing that all offers of employment by such lessee-licensee shall first be made to the Employer's classified
laid-off Employees on the Employer's panels of the Employer's operations covered
by this Agreement, if such employment at the leased, subleased or licensed out
location is for jobs of the nature covered by this Agreement, and if such Employees are qualified for such jobs."

As noted above, the Article II JOBS provision is lengthy and
complex and contains detailed requirements with respect to its implementation and administration. The remainder of this Article will
discuss some of the principal legal issues raised thus far under Article
II.
B.

PrincipalIssues Arising Under Article II
1. Who is an Employer?

The requirements of Article II relate to an "Employer." Where
a signatory employer may have an affiliation with other signatory
or nonsignatory operators, the breadth of the term "Employer" may
be dispositive of the extent to which the Article II Jobs provision
applies.
Historically, the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement has
defined "Employer" as a signatory to the Agreement. 9 Thus, the
first sentence in the 1988 Agreement, in the same manner as past
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements, states: "This Agreement, made this 1st day of February, 1988 between the coal operators and associations signatory hereto, as parties of the first part
(each coal operator which is a signatory hereto being called

67. Id.
68. Id. at 12.
69. 1971 Agreement, Art. I at 1; 1974 Agreement, Art. I at 1; 1978 Agreement, Art. I at 1;
1981 Agreement, Art. I at 1; 1984 Agreement, Art. I at 1; 1988 Agreement, Art. I at 1.
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"Employer") .... 7 (Emphasis added.) Under this definition, the
Employer is easily identified, and the entity of which obligations
under the Article II JOBS provision apply is fairly straight forward.
However, where a signatory Employer is affiliated with other signatory or nonsignatory companies, the UMWA may argue that a
different definition of Employer applies.
That different definition is found in both Article XVII(h) and
Article XVII(k) of the Agreement. 71 In both of those provisions, the
following language is found:
Signatory companies and coal producing divisions thereof and wholly owned and
controlled coal producing subsidiaries and wholly-owned and controlled coal producing affiliates shall be treated as one and the same Employer for panel rights
72
purposes.

(Emphasis added.)
This language first appeared in the 1974 Agreement and has remained unchanged in subsequent Agreements, including the 1988
Agreement. If this provision were to apply in certain corporate settings, the term Employer could potentially be broadened beyond an
individual's signatory company.
There are numerous reasons why the Article XVII definition of
Employer does not apply. First, it is becoming increasingly clear
that the job offers required under Article II do not constitute panel
rights within the meaning of Article XVII. Panel rights are preferential hiring rights offered to laid-off employees of an employer.
Such laid-off employees are recalled to job openings in accordance
with their seniority and their ability to step in and perform the work
required by the vacant job. As discussed, the Article II jobs provision creates a job opportunity separate and distinct from panel
rights. Indeed, in Johnstown Coal Co. and UMWA, District 17,
Local Union 1766,73 one of the initial cases decided under the Article
II JOBS Provision, the arbitrator stated: "Those clauses, i.e., the

70.
71.
72.
73.

Supra note 62, at 1.
1988 Agreement, art. XVII, §§ h, k at 103, 111.
Id.
Case No. 88-17-88-213 (Nov. 17, 1988) (Feldman, Arb.)
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present Art II(b) and the present Article XVII are mutually exclusive
of one another, with the exception of the order of job offer. To
say that all the clauses of Article XVII pertain to Article II(B) is
improper. 74 A number of other arbitrators have also recognized this
distinction, and an arbitral consensus appears to be developing that
Article XVII panel rights and Article II job opportunities are sep75
arate and distinct concepts .

Even if panel rights were involved under Article II, and the Article XVII definition were to apply, it would not apply to separate
companies unless they were all owned by a signatory employer. A
good illustration of this principle is found in UMWA, District 23,
Local Union 1605 and Arch-on-the-Green, Inc. 76 There, laid-off Union employees of Arch-on-the-Green sought panel rights at other
subsidiaries of Arch Mineral Corporation, a nonsignatory company.
The UMWA argued that Arch-on-the-Green and other subsidiaries
of Arch Mineral Corporation were "one and the same employer for
panel rights purposes" under the Article XVII language discussed
above because they were all wholly-owned by Arch Mineral Corporation. The arbitrator held, consistent with past interpretation,
that Article XVII required that the wholly-owning entity had to itself
be a signatory, and that there was no proof that Arch-on-the-Green
had been acting as the agent of its stock owner at the time it entered
into the 1984 Agreement. Moreover, because Arch-on-the-Green and
the other subsidiaries were "operated as completely separate companies, and one was not controlled by the other" the "controlled"
portion of the Article XVII test was also not met.

74. Id. at 10.
75. Burning Rock Energy, Inc. and UMWA, Dist. 29, Local Union 1335, No. 88-29-89-46 (July
18, 1989) (Vaughn Arb.); Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. and UMWA, Local Union 1503, No. 89-17-89473 (Oct. 31, 1989) (Probst Arb.); Sang Branch Mining and UMWA, Dist. 17, Local 5922, No. 8817-89-511 (Nov. 1, 1989) (Hewitt, Arb.); UMWA, Dist. 17, Local Union 9619 and Donner Mining
Co., No. 88-17-89-640 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Phelan, Arb.); UMWA, Dist. 17, Local Union 9177 and Peabody Coal Co., No. 88-17-89-425 (Apr. 23, 1990) (Phelan, Arb.); but see UMWA, Dist. 17, Local
8843 and Cannelton Indus., Inc. v. Pen Mining Co., No. 88-17-89-611 (Dec. 22, 1989) (Suster, Arb.)
at p.14 ("This Arbitrator reads the offer of employment to be a part of the recall of employees from
employers' panels, an obligation protected by panel rights, rather than something distinct and separate.")
76. No. 84-23-87-37A (Sept. 18, 1987) (Phelan, Arb.).
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It has also been established that the Article XVII definition may
not be used to amalgamate signatory and nonsignatory entities, even
if they are wholly-owned by a signatory Employer. For example, in
Barnes and Tucker Company and District 2, Local Union 1269,
UA WA,

77

the arbitrator held:

The Union's claim for relief under Article XVII must also fail ... since the overwhelming weight of arbitral authority seems to indicate that recall rights under
Article XVII only apply to mines of a signatory employer covered by the Agreement. In other words, one cannot have panel rights to a mine that is operated

by a nonsignatory employer or to a mine not covered by the Agreement.

(Emphasis added.)
The construction of the Article XVII definition of Employer as
only relating to signatory entities also best comports with the Article
I definition of Employer discussed above and accommodates the
differences between the Article I definition and Article XVII. It will
be recalled that Article I defines "Employer" as a signatory to the
1988 Agreement. Under the construction outlined above, Article XVII
would similarly be limited to the amalgamation of those signatory
employers which are, in turn, wholly-owned and wholly-controlled
by a signatory Employer.
2. Who Must Arbitrate Disputes Arising Under Article II?
Any disputes that arise under Article II, relating to an Employer's obligations at its own new or newly acquired coal mines,
are arbitrable under Article XXIII of the 1988 Agreement between
the Employer and the UMWA.7 There is nothing remarkable about
this. 79 What is remarkable is the obligation of Article II(B)(5), re77. No. 84-BT-2-2 (Nov. 30, 1987) (DiLauro, Arb.) at 19.
78. The 1988 Agreement, like past National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements, contains in
Article XXIII a four step grievance and arbitration procedure culminating in arbitration. Article
II(A)(6) states that: "Any disputes that arise under this Section shall be resolved pursuant to the
procedures set forth under Article XXIII of this Agreement."
79. It is not remarkable that the parties would have seen fit to include disputes with respect
to an Employer's application of Article II at its own new or newly acquired operations, to the extent
that such disputes involve the initial offer of employment. However, Article II(A)(6) could have
unintended consequences, to the extent that there is an attempt to apply the "any disputes" language
to cover other disputes arising out of the employment relationship at the new or newly acquired
operations.
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lating to Article II obligations of lessees and licensees. Article II(B)(5)
provides:
Any disputes regarding this section shall be resolved between the prior Employer
and the Employee under Article XXIII of this Agreement (the arbitration provisions). The Employer agrees that it will reserve in any lease, sublease or license
subject to this section the ability of the Employer to remedy any finding as to
noncompliance of an Employee's right to be considered for employment opportunity as provided herein. If it chooses in its discretion to permit a sublease or
sublicense, the Employer shall also require the lessee-licensee to convey this hiring
obligation in any sublease or sublicense.,,

The requirement that disputes as to the coverage of Article II
be resolved in arbitration proceedings between the lessor-licensor
employer and the affected laid-off employee may have severe consequences for lessees and licensees. First, no clearly defined procedure exists for permitting a lessee-licensee to be a party to such
proceedings, although their rights are clearly at stake. Moreover, an
Employer, faced with grievances from its laid-off employees requesting jobs with lessees and licensees, may have very little incentive
to resist those grievances.81 Indeed, the lessor-licensor could conceivably settle such disputes prior to arbitration .82 Under the provisions of Article II(B)(5), the Employer is required to make the
lessee-licensee accept the results of such proceedings. 83
Where the dispute centers on a lessee-licensee's purported failure
to offer a job to a laid-off employee of the Employer in accordance
80. 1988 Agreement at 14.
81. Under these circumstances, the utility of objecting to being a party to any arbitration proceeding arising out of such a grievance is called in question. To date, no procedures have been
developed under which a lessee-licensee may become a party to the lessor-licensor Employer's arbitration proceeding. The Stump Coal Co., Cannelton Indus. and Sang Branch cases, discussed below,
involved highly peculiar factual circumstances.
82. 1988 Agreement, art. XXIII, §(h), at 228.
83. Article II(B)(5), on its face, would appear to make the lessor-licensor Employer responsible
for requiring the lessee-licensee to implement the resolution of "any dispute" which might arise with
respect to the lessee-licensee's compliance with Article I. At first blush this may appear to be at
odds with Article II(B)(6), which provides: "The prior Employer shall not be a guarantor or be held
liable for any breach of the lessee-licensee of its hiring or bargaining obligations or the terms of any
agreement between the Union and the lessee-licensee." However, it appears that the latter provision
is meant to save the lessor-licensor Employer from suffering any liability for back pay, benefits, and
the like, based on a lessee or licensee's failure to abide by its Article II obligations. The Article
II(B)(5) provision, on the other hand, seems aimed at an Employer's obligation to reserve in a lease
or license the right to order a lessee or licensee to comply with the resolution of any dispute" under
Article XXIII.
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with Article II's requirements, the employment relationship exists
only between the Employer and the laid-off employee, not the lesseelicensee and the laid-off employee. In such circumstances, the laidoff employee "has no standing in a situation involved in an action
against the licensee because that person is not an employee within
the meaning of the language of either the grievance procedure or
the work jurisdiction clauses under the terms of the contract.' '84 As
was explained in UMWA, District 17, Local Union 9619 and Donner
Mining Company:
.. it is clear that what is being given to Employees on a panel is the right to

a job offer from someone who leases or received a license from their Employer
for the purpose of conducting some mining or mining related activity which is
of the nature of work covered by the National Agreement.
Since the right to a job offer from a lessee-licensee does not make the Employee

with only that right an Employee of the lessee-licensor, the Employee must look
to the lessor-licensor, the prior Employer, for enforcement of his employment
rights.

It is for that reason that Article IIB(5) directs the Employee to the prior Employer
where there is a dispute over the obligation which the lessee-licensee owes to the
Employer.8 5

That situation may change where the lessee-licensee is a signatory. In UMWA, District 17, Local Union 8843 and Cannelton Indus. Inc. and Penn Mining Co., 6 however, the UMWA prosecuted
a grievance against a licensor Employer and the licensee. The arbitrator noted that this was not inconsistent with the decision in
KMF Corporation, which had dismissed a grievance because it was
brought against the licensee and not the licensor or employer. The
arbitrator stated "In the instant case the issue is entirely different.
Here, the Union brings the claim against the primary employer and
contests the action of the licensee within the body of the grievance." 8 7 The record does not indicate whether the licensee protested
its party status, but it apparently did not."8
84. KMF Corp. and UMWA, Dist. 17, Local Union 9735, No. 88-17-88-168 (Dec. 30, 1988)
(Feldman, Arb.) at p.12.
85. No. 88-17-89-640 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Phelan, Arb.) at 8-9.
86. No. 88-17-89-611 (Dec. 22, 1989) (Suster, Arb.).
87. Id. at 9.
88. See supra note 86.
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Stump Coal Company and UMWA, District 30, Local Union
14169 also involved the application of Article II and permitted the
assertion of the grievance against a signatory licensee alone, in a
dispute over whether a laid-off employee of the licensee, or a laidoff employee of the licensor Employer, was entitled to a job offer.
In that case, the laid-off employee of the licensee was asserting a
panel right arising under Article XVII, while the laid-off employee
of the licensor Employer was asserting a job offer right under Article
II. Under the KMF Corporation and Cannelton Industries decisions
discussed above, the Article II rights asserted by the employee of
the licensor Employer should have been asserted under Article II(B)(5)
against the licensor Employer, and not the licensee alone. Under the
circumstances of Stump Coal, however, which included the fact that
the licensee was signatory, and that initially the licensee had agreed
to arbitrate the matter, the arbitrator allowed the grievance to be
prosecuted against the licensee alone. 90
Finally, it should be noted that once an Employer's laid-off employee has been offered and has accepted employment with a lesseelicensee, subsequent questions with respect to the application of Article II rights with the lessee-licensee are subject to arbitration under
the lessee-licensee's collective bargaining agreement, if one exists. 91
This would not, of course, be the case where the lessee-licensee remained a nonsignatory with no duty to arbitrate.
3.

Must A Pre-existing Lessee-Licensee Apply Article II?

The language of Article II(B)(9) addresses the problem of lessees
and licensees which are in existence as of the date that Article II
becomes applicable. 9 2 The obvious issue is that pre-existing business
arrangements between an Employer and a lessee-licensee may not
be amenable to revision to take account of the requirements of Article II. Article II purports to deal with this issue in Article II(B)(9),
which states:
89. No. 88-30-89-35 (Mar. 31, 1989) (Beckman, Arb.).
90. Id.
91. Sang Branch Mining and UMWA, Dist. 17, Local Union 5922, No. 88-17-89-511 (Nov. 1,
1989) (Hewitt, Arb.).
92. 1988 Agreement at 15-16.
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Section B shall become effective immediately upon the effective date of this Agreement. For purposes of complying with this section, all hiring by any lessee-licensee
for work of a nature covered by this Agreement after the effective date shall
comply with this section. However, no lessee-licensee operating on the Employer's
bituminous coal lands as of the effective date of this Agreement (hereinafter the
"current lessee-licensee") shall be required to terminate or lay off any employee
on its active payroll at such locations as of that date in order to comply with
the foregoing hiring obligation. Furthermore, a current lessee-licensee shall not
be required to comply with the foregoing hiring obligations at those locations
until 90 days after the effective date of this Agreement, except if the lease, sublease
license under which the current lessee-licensee is conducting those operation(s)
expires, terminates or is extended with Employer prior to the 90 day deadline or
except if such lease, sublease or license involves a former signatory operation of
the Employer. In the case of these two latter exceptions, the foregoing hiring
obligation shall become effective immediately.91

A major split in arbitral authority has developed over this provision. 94 In Pennsylvania Mines Corporation and UMWA, District
2, Local Union 1609, 95 a signatory employer had a pre-existing lease
with a nonsignatory lessee, North Cambria Fuel Company ("Cambria"). The lease was for a term of ten years and had been entered
on July 21, 1987, nearly six months prior to the effective date of
Article II.

The Union maintained that Article II(B)(9) constituted an absolute promise to require pre-existing lessees to comply with Article

II no later than 90 days following the effective date of Article 11.96
The company argued that its lease with Cambria simply did not
permit it to impose such an obligation. 97 The arbitrator was thus

faced with a severe conflict between the purported requirements of
Article II, and the limitations of the pre-existing business arrange-

ment. 98 The arbitrator resolved the conflict in favor of the Employer.
He held:

93. Id.
94. Compare Pennsylvania Mines Corp. and UMWA, Dist. 2, Local Union 1609, No. 88-288-14 (Oct. 26, 1989) (Dissen, Arb.) with UMWA, Dist. 17, Local Union 9177 and Peabody Coal
Co., No. 88-17-89-425 (April 23, 1990) (Phelan, Arb.) (discussed supra at 75).
95. No. 88-2-88-14 (Oct. 26, 1989) (Dissent, Arb.).
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 8.
98. In discussing the case, the arbitrator noted the addition of "coal lands" to the requirements
of Article IIB was intended to close a "loophole" which had existed under former Article IA(h)(2)(7), which only covered leasing, subleasing or licensing out of "operations." Id. at 12.
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The Employer's compliance with the labor contract in this instance should, therefore, be determined by reference to obligations existing under the 1984 Agreement
and not by reference to utterly new terms introduced in 1988. It cannot reasonably
be asserted that the Employer should be held accountable for a failure to anticipate
its obligations under the 1988 Agreement and to assume those obligations even
before the effective date of the Agreement. The Employer cannot be held accountable for a failure to incorporate assurance of panel-based hiring into its
lease arrangement with Cambria when such an obligation simply did not exist
under the Wage Agreement in effect at the time the lease was entered into."

Under such circumstances, the arbitrator continued:
[t]he most that can be expected from the Employer in keeping with the spirit of
the JOBS provision is that it approached Cambria with a request to jointly amend
the lease in order to incorporate the hiring procedures of Article II B. That,
according to testimony, has already been attempted, without success.
Where the Employer has approached the lessee in an earnest effort to have the
hiring obligations of II B incorporated into a pre-existing lease of coal lands and
the attempt has proved unsuccessful, and the lease relationship affords no other
practicable method by which the Employer can incorporate such obligations into
the lease, no violation of II B will be found to have occurred.'W

Two other notable decisions immediately followed Pennsylvania
Mines. First, in Cannelton Industries, Inc. and UMWA, District 17,
Local Union 8843,101 the employer had a lease with Terry Eagle Coal
Company which pre-dated the effective date of the 1988 Agreement.10 2 The arbitrator at first appeared to agree with the Pennsylvania Mine decision that an Employer's obligations with respect
to a lease or a license must be determined as of the date the lease
or license was entered into. 0 3 However, unlike the arbitrator in
Pennsylvania Mines, the arbitrator in Cannelton in reality saw this
result as being based on a "grandfathering" granted under Article
II(B)(9), and not as an application of the principle that issues affecting a lease or license are to be adjudicated in accordance with
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement in effect at the time
the lease or license was entered.' ° The arbitrator in the Cannelton
99. Id.at 14.
100. Id.
101. No. 88-17-88-115 (Dec. 2, 1988) (Hewitt, Arb.).
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. ("The arbitrator agrees with the Company that the date of the occurrence determines
which contract will be utilized to determine the substantive issue of the grievance.").
104. Id.at 8.
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case thus held that the grandfathering of pre-1988 Agreement leases

was dependent upon compliance with the notice requirement contained in Article II(B)(11).lo 5

In Cannelton, the company had admittedly (and mistakenly) failed
to give notice of the Terry Eagle lease to the UMWA.

10

6

The ar-

bitrator held that this failure to notify the UMWA in a timely manner with respect to the Terry Eagle lease forfeited the grandfathering

granted by Article II for pre-existing lessees and required Cannelton
to comply with Article II with respect to the Terry Eagle lease. 0
In a later case, Cannelton Industries, Penn Mining Company and
UMWA, District 17, Local Union 8843,108 the arbitrator addressed

the issue of a licensee working under a year-to-year, renewable contract. There was no dispute in this case that Cannelton had given
notice of the contract, which had first been entered into prior to
the effective date of the 1988 Agreement. The company sought to

establish, however, that because the initial term of the contract was
entered into prior to the 1988 Agreement, that subsequent annual
terms would not be subject to the 1988 Agreement's Article II pro-

vision. 1°9 The arbitrator rejected this reasoning, stating:

105. Id. Article II(B)(11) states: "Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this Agreement,
the Employer shall provide to the appropriate District President(s) a list of its lessee/licensees as of
the effective date of this Agreement, with the same information as set forth in Section B(7)."
Article II(B)(7) requires such notices to ". . . [d]isclose the identity of all parties to the transaction
and the location and identity of the bituminous coal lands, operations and/or other facilities affected
thereby including the relevant MSHA legal I.D. number."
106. Id. at 3.
107. The arbitrator did not explain how this was to be done, given the fact that Cannelton
apparently did not have the legal ability to force Terry Eagle to comply with Article II. This could
obviously lead to a dispute between the lessee and the lessor, resulting in a claim for damages if an
attempt were made to nullify the lease. However, because the employer no longer "controlled" the
work which the Union sought under the grievance, it having been apparently irrevocably leased to
Terry Eagle prior to the advent of Article II, the award in the Cannelton case may very well violate
Section 8(e) of the Act. See NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490, 504 (1980) ("[t]he
contracting employer must have the power to give the employees the work in question-the so-called
'right of control' test.. ."). Indeed, the General Counsel of the NLRB has issued a complaint claiming
that the award in the Cannelton case does violate section 8(e), and that the prosecution of a grievance
and other actions taken in furtherance of the award violate section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act. Dist. 17
United Mine Workers of America et al. (Cannelton Indus., Inc.), Case Nos. 9-CC-1373-1-2-3 and 9CE-53-1-2-3 (Mar. 13, 1990).
108. 88-17-89-550 (Nov. 15, 1989) (Feldman, Arb.).
109. Id. at 5.
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The Cannelton-Pen contract is not "grandfathered" as to those additional terms
of contract that began after the advent of the 1988 Agreement. The 1988 Agreement and the extended panel rights indicated therein has application therefore to
the "non-grandfathered" portion of the writing between Pen and Cannelton. The
company complied with all of the conditions precedent for the portion contracted
under the 1984 contract and there is no reason therefore, to allow the protest in
this particular matter as to that portion of the multiple contracts. However, the
1988 Agreement does apply to all of those contracts between Pen and Cannelton
beginning after the 1988 Agreement effective date."'

The foregoing developments, including notions such as "grandfathering" and its waiver for failure to give appropriate notice, as
well as the general principle that leases and licenses would be governed by the provision of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement in effect at the time they were entered, were swept aside
in UMWA, Dist. 17, Local Union 9177 and Peabody Coal Company.' There the arbitrator held:
While the [union's] claim obviously involves a contract mining agreement which
was entered into under the term of the 1984 National Agreement, the claim is
for a right contained in the 1988 National Agreement, and over a violation of
that contractural right which occurred during the term of the 1988 National Agreement. It is therefore the 1988 National Agreement which is the governing contract
in this case, and the one under which the claim is to be decided.11z

The issue was stated as being "... . whether an Employer who
has already leased or licensed out coal lands prior to the effective

date of the 1988 National Agreement is required to have the lesseelicensee operating under that old lease or license abide by the Article

II(B) hiring obligations which were newly imposed by the 1988 Na3
tional Agreement.""
Unlike the Arbitrator in Pennsylvania Mines, the arbitrator in
Peabody Coal ruled that the pre-existing leases were subject to Artile 1I(B), and specifically rejected the earlier decision." 4 The Pea-

body Coal arbitrator held that the provisions of Article II particularly Article II(B)(9), (10), and (11), demonstrated that the
110. Id.at 11.
111. No. 88-17-89-425 (April 23, 1990) (Phelan, Arb.).
112. Id.at 8.
113. Id.at 8-9.
114. Id.at 12, n.1.
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negotiators of the 1988 Agreement clearly and unambiguously intended pre-existing leases and licenses to be covered by Article II(B). n1
When these three provisions are read together, it is clear that
lessee-licensees who were operating on an Employer's coal lands pursuant to an existing lease or license on February 1, 1988 were intended to be covered by the new hiring obligations that Employers
had to make a part of their leasing and licensing arrangements. The
1988 National Agreement did not deal with the question of how an
Employer was to make those hiring obligations a part of an existing
lease or license, but left that to the discretion of the Employer. The
contractual obligation was to see that it was done within 90 days.
No exception was made for a situation in which an Employer did
not have any right under its arrangement with a lessee or licensee
11 6
to make such a change.
As a remedy, the arbitrator ordered that Peabody, the licensor,
was liable for wages lost by the grievant, to be measured by the
amount paid by the licensee to the person who was actually em17
ployed by the licensee in the grievant's place.
Unless this split in arbitral interpretation is resolved, the obligations of a lessor-licensee employer will be left in extreme doubt
with the potential for the accrual of significant liability where pre8
existing leases and licenses are found to be subject to Article II(B).1
4. Is Article II Legal?
Last, but most importantly, among the issues arising under Article II are questions regarding its legality. The Article II JOBS provision under certain circumstances, requires that an employer afford
115. Id. at 11. Article 1I(B)(9) provides, with certain exceptions, a 90-day delay for the applicability of Article II to existing lessees-licensees; Article II(B)(10) discusses the effect of Article II

where an existing lessee-licensee has a collective bargaining obligation to recognize panel rights under
a collective bargaining agreement with the UMWA or other union; and Article II(3)(11) requires the
signatory
116.
117.
118.

to provide the UMWA with a list of existing lessees-licensees.
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 13-14.
The Peabody Coal decision would appear to violate Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e) of the National

Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), 158(e), in the same manner as the earlier
Cannelton award, see n. 107 above. The Cannelton case before the NLRB may resolve this split if
the General Counsel's complaint is successful.
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a hiring preference to people who, by virtue of their past employment, are members of and represented by the UMWA over those
who are not. 119 Such preferences based upon union adherence, or
the lack of it, are generally contrary to a basic principle of the
NLRA, that employees are to be neither rewarded nor punished for
20
their union adherence, membership, or activity.
The provisions of Article II requiring a signatory employer to
provide a hiring preference for laid-off employees of the signatory
with a lessee or licensee which is not closely tied to it are new in
the coal industry. However, in industries where employment is characterized by a succession of temporary jobs of short duration, hiring
is commonly done through such systems. The legality of such arrangements was initially resolved by the United States Supreme Court
in Local 357, InternationalBro. of Team. Etc. v. NLRB. 2 1 There,
the Supreme Court approved the hiring hail procedure even though
it no doubt encouraged union membership. It ruled, however, that
the encouragement given to union membership was only permitted
when the hiring hall was fairly conducted and referrals made without
regard for union membership. 2 2 Hence, the Court held the en23
couragement could not be "accomplished by discrimination."1
Since Teamsters, cases have approved a preference for hiring
union members where the hiring is with the same employer,'2 or
where the hiring is with another member of a multiemployer bargaining group in which the employer is a member and the employees
of which members all constitute a single appropriate bargaining
unit.125

119. 1988 Agreement, art. I, at 2 ("...
as a condition of employment, all Employees at operations covered by this Agreement shall be, or become, members of the United Mine Workers of
America to the extent and in the manner permitted by law ..
"). Such clauses, which are a type
of union security clause, are permitted under certain circumstances under federal law, unless a state
enacts a statute forbidding them in that state. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §§ 8(a)(3),

14(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 164(b).
120. National Labor Relations Act, §7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
121. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
122. Id. at 674-677.
123. Id. at 675.
124. NLRB GENRA.
(NATIONAL RIGHT TO

CotsEL ADViCE MEMORaNDUM, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. SATURN CORP.

VoRK CoMMITTEE), Case No. 7-CB-6582 (June 2, 1986).

125. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewiry Workers Local Union, No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984).
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However, when employees are given a hiring preference because
of their previous work for a signatory employer which is not a member of the same multiemployer group, or whose employees do not
otherwise constitute a single appropriate bargaining unit with employees of the hiring employer, then the arrangements may be held
illegal. 126 Employers abiding by such an illegal clause may violate
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
by discriminating in favor of employees because of their union adherence, membership or activity. Unions enforcing such clauses may
violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by similar discrimination and compelling
employers to discriminate.
Although no cases have been brought to date challenging this
aspect of Article II, there is some precedent that an individual may
not be denied full seniority with an employer under the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement on the basis that all of his service
was not at a union-represented operation. In Dist. 23, UMWA and
Peabody Coal Co.,127 the National Labor Relations Board found

that the UMWA's giving effect to a contract requiring such discrimination constituted a violation of section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA.
In the words of the Board, "Maintaining and enforcing a contractual
provision which accords preference to employees based on union
considerations can cause, or be an attempt to cause, discrimination
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2)."' 1 Thus, the Article II JOBS
provision provides a basis for arguing that the protections granted
thereunder constitute an impermissible preference based on "union
considerations," and may, therefore, be subject to legal challenge. 129

126. See IATSE Local 659 (MPO-TV of California), 197 NLRB 1187, 1189 (1972, enforced),
477 F.2d 450 (D.C.C. 1973) (Table); New York Typographical Union No. 6 (Royal Composing Room),
242 NLRB 378, 379 (1979), enforcement denied in part sub nom., NLRB v. New York Typographical
Union, 632 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1980); Director's Guild of Am., Inc. (Assoc. of Motion Picture &

Television Producers, Inc.), 198 NLRB 707, 709 (1972).
127.
128.
(1983).
129.
regarding

293 NLRB No. 7 (1989).
Id. at 4, citing Operating Engineers, Local 132 (National Engineering), 266 NLRB 977, 981
It should also be noted that the Cannelton and Peabody Coal decisions discussed above,
the application of Article IIB to pre-existing leases and licenses, also present significant

questions regarding the legality of Article II under Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) and 158(e). See pp. 969-972, supra. Indeed, these cases raise
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Article II JOBS provision is the culmination of two decades
of struggle by the UMWA to both protect the jobs of its members,
as well as acquire additional work for them. The business plans of
both employers and entities doing business with employers have been,
and will undoubtedly continue to be, affected by the impact of Article II. Its provisions are complex and undoubtedly will continue
to present grist for the arbitral mill. There is the possibility that
significant litigation may ensue with respect to the legality of Article
II. Future collective bargaining may very well hinge on an attempt
to expand or modify the coverage of Article II. The resolution of

the issues identified herein, and the others which are sure to arise,
will require not only a thorough knowledge of Article II, but an
understanding of how and why it came to be.

the possibility that Article II may be illegal per se to the extent that it purports to apply to the leasing
of coal lands where the employer had never operated, and where the employer will receive none of
the coal produced by the lessee. See International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots and
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 220 NLRB 164, affirmed sub nom. Danielson v. Int'l Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots, 521 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1975) (work on ship never operated by employer not part
of unit work of crews of other ships operated by employer). See also Westmoreland Coal Company
(United Mine Workers of America), Case No. II-CA-13166 (March 31, 1989) (facial illegality of Article
II asserted as defense to § 8(a)(5) complaint for purported failure of company to provide information
to union regarding, inter alia, company's subsidiaries owning coal lands).
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APPENDIX

ARTICLE II

JOB OPPORTUNITY AND BENEFIT SECURITY
(JOBS)

The parties hereto recognize and agree that the production of
bituminous coal involves, by its very nature, the depletion of resources at work locations. The parties agree further that varied mining arrangements and technological advances can adversely impact
on job security and that their mutual goals of mining coal safely
and efficiently can best be achieved by the use of experienced miners
who are knowledgeable of the Employer's standards of operation.
As a result of the special nature of the bituminous coal mining
industry and the parties' desire to develop a relationship in which
the Employees as well as the Employers gain from a growth in productivity, the parties agree to establish the Job Opportunity and
Benefit Security (JOBS) Program. The JOBS Program is designed
to achieve, to the fullest extent allowed by law, job security for
classified employees through extended panel rights and new training
opportunities. Nothing in the JOBS Program shall be construed to
diminish any rights of the Employees or the Union established in
any other provision of this Agreement including, but not limited to,
the successorship clause, Article 1A(h) and Article XVII.
A. Non-Signatory Operations
1. Except as modified in Section C, the first three out of every
five new job openings for work of a nature covered by this Agreement at any existing, new, or newly acquired non-signatory bituminous coal operation of the Employer shall be filled by classified
laid-off Employees on the panels of the Employer's operations covered by this Agreement. If the newly acquired or non-signatory operation has a panel of laid-off employees established pursuant to a
valid collective bargaining agreement, those individuals shall first be
recalled before this section applies.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/6
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2. Selection of employees for the above three out of every five
new job openings shall be made from the senior Employee among
the classified laid-off Employees on the Employer's panels, who has
the ability to step into and perform the work of the job at the time
the job is filled. The order of selection of Article XVII shall also
apply selecting first from Employees on the panels of the Employer's
operations covered by this Agreement within the district where the
nonsignatory operation is located, next from Employees on the panels of the Employer's operations covered by this Agreement within
contiguous districts, and then from Employees on the panels of the
Employer's operations covered by this Agreement within non-contiguous districts. The Employer shall not be required to make more
than one offer of employment per operation to each such Employee,
provided that offer is for work of the type listed on his panel form
and the Employee refuses or fails to respond to that offer or report
for the job. The Employer may also consider its classified laid-off
employees on its panels for the last two out of every five job openings, which are to be selected at the Employer's sole discretion.
3. The filling of a position by an active employee at a nonsignatory operation as the result of his reassignment from one position at that operation to another position at that same operation
does not constitute the filling of a new job opening for purposes
of this section.
4. Offers of employment made to classified laid-off Employees
on the Employer's panels pursuant to this section, shall be made
without regard to the listing of that particular operation on the
Employee's panel form.
5. Acceptance or rejection of an offer of employment under this
section or any personnel action at the non-signatory operation shall
not affect such Employee's other panel rights with the Employer as
established by this Agreement.
6. Any disputes that arise under this Section shall be resolved
pursuant to the procedures set forth under Article XXIII of this
Agreement.
7. Nothing in this section shall operate to extend the bargaining
unit as of the date of this Agreement nor expand the rights of the
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Union with regard to the non-signatory operations, except for the
job opportunities made available under this section.
8. Section A shall become effective immediately upon the effective date of this Agreement. No Employer shall be required to
terminate or lay off any employee on its active payroll at said operations as of that date in order to comply with the foregoing hiring
obligations. For purposes of complying with the foregoing, all hiring
for jobs of a nature covered by this Agreement after the effective
date shall be made in accordance with this section. Furthermore,
except as modified by Section C, if the Employer has an existing
UMWA panel obligation or other collective bargaining obligation
at the operation, it shall first recognize such obligation.
B.

Lessee-Licensee

1. For purposes of lawfully preserving and protecting job opportunities for the Employees covered by this Agreement, the Employer further agrees that it will not lease, sublease, or license out
any bituminous coal lands, bituminous coal mining operations and
other facilities of the Employer unless the conditions set forth in
the following paragraphs are satisfied.
2. Leasing, subleasing, or licensing out of such lands or operations shall be permitted where the lessee-licensee agrees in writing
that all offers of employment by such lessee-licensee shall first be
made to the Employer's classified laid-off Employees on the Employer's panels of the Employer's operations covered by this Agreement, if such employment at the leased, subleased or licensed out
location is for jobs of the nature covered by this Agreement, and
if such Employees are qualified for such jobs.
3. Selection of employees for these offers of employment shall
be made from the senior Employee among the classified laid-off
Employees on the Employer's panels, who has the ability to step
into and perform the work of the job at the time the job is filled.
The order of selection of Article XVII also shall apply: selecting
first from Employees on the panels of the Employer's operations
covered by this Agreement within the district where the lessee-licensee's operation is located, next from Employees on the panels
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/6
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of the Employer's operations covered by this Agreement from districts contiguous to the district where the lessee-licensee's operation
is located, and then from Employees on the panels of the Employer's
operations covered by this Agreement within non-contiguous districts. The lessee-licensee shall not be required to make more than
one such offer of employment per operation to each such Employee,
provided that offer is for work of the type listed on his panel form
and the Employee refuses or fails to respond to that offer or report
for the job.
4. Acceptance or rejection of such an offer of employment made
by a lessee-licensee or any personnel action between the Employee
and lessee-licensee shall not affect such Employee's panel rights with
the Employer as established by this Agreement.
5. Any disputes regarding this section shall be resolved between
the prior Employer and the Employee under Article XXIII of this
Agreement. The Employer agrees that it will reserve in any lease,
sublease or license subject to this section the ability of the Employer
to remedy any finding as to noncompliance of an Employee's rights
to be considered for employment opportunity as provided herein.
If it chooses in its discretion to permit a sublease or sublicense, the
Employer shall also require the lessee-licensee to convey this hiring
obligation in any sublease or sublicense.
6. The prior Employer shall not be a guarantor or be held liable
for any breach of the lessee-licensee of its hiring or bargaining obligations or the terms of any agreement between the Union and the
lessee-licensee.
7. Within ten (10) days after the lease, sublease or licensing out
of any bituminous coal lands, coal mining operations and/or other
facilities, but in any event prior to the time that work of a nature
covered by this Agreement commences, the Employer shall provide
notice thereof to the appropriate District President. Such notice shall
disclose the identity of all parties to the transaction and the location
and identity of the bituminous coal lands, operations and/or other
facilities affected thereby including the relevant MSHA legal I.D.
number.
8. The Union agrees that this section, or its implementation, in
no manner extends the bargaining unit of the Employer and does
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not create a joint employer, single employer, alter ego, agency relationship or successor relationship between the Employer and the
lessee-licensee, which does not otherwise exist without reference to
this section or its implementation.
9. Section B shall become effective immediately upon the effective date of this Agreement. For purposes of complying with this
section, all hiring by any lessee-licensee for work of a nature covered
by this Agreement after the effective date shall comply with this
section. However, no lessee-licensee operating on the Employer's
bituminous coal lands as of the effective date of this Agreement
(hereinafter, the "current lessee-licensee") shall be required to terminate or lay off any employee on its active payroll at such locations
as of that date in order to comply with the foregoing hiring obligation. Furthermore, a current lessee-licensee shall not be required
to comply with the foregoing hiring obligations at those locations
until 90 days after the effective date of this Agreement, except if
the lease, sublease or license under which the current lessee-licensee
is conducting those operation(s) expires, terminates or is extended
with the Employer prior to the 90 day deadline or except if such
lease, sublease or license involves a former signatory operation of
the Employer. In the case of these two latter exceptions, the foregoing hiring obligations shall become effective immediately.
10. In the event the current lessee-licensee has an existing UMWA
panel obligation or other collective bargaining obligation at any location on the Employer's bituminous coal lands, it shall first recognize such obligation except when its new operation was at any
time a signatory operation of the Employer, in which case the Employer's laid-off Employees must be given the first offers of employment as provided in Section B(2) and (3) above before any other
individual is employed in work of a classified nature.
11. Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this Agreement, the Employer shall provide to the appropriate District President(s) a list of its lessee-licensees as of the effective date of the
Agreement, with the same information as set forth in Section B(7).
C. Coordination of Employment Obligations Under the JOBS
Program
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/6
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At those locations where the Employer hereto is the lessee-licensee of another employer which is also party to the obligations
of Article II, the Employer hereto shall first honor the hiring obligations to which it should be bound as a result of lessor-licensor's
agreement with the Union. Thereafter, and at all other locations
covered by this Article, the Employer hereto shall follow the requirements of Sections A and B above.
D.

Employer-Wide Panel Rights to Signatory Operations

Each Employer also agrees to extend employer-wide panel rights
to its signatory operations pursuant to Article XVII. Accordingly,
within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of this Agreement,
a laid-off employee may revise his panel form for any purpose, in
addition to his annual right of revision under Article XVII(d).
E.

UMWA-BCOA Training and Education Fund

Section 1. Establishment
The parties hereto recognize that unemployment currently exists
in the various coalfields and that unemployment places burdens on
UMWA miners, their families and communities. To lessen those
burdens and to aid them in acquiring gainful employment, the parties hereby establish the UMWA-BCOA Training and Education
Fund.
Section 2. Purpose
The UMWA-BCOA Training and Education Fund is established
to provide financial assistance for training or education to unemployed UMWA miners, who have performed classified work under
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1988 or any predecessor agreement thereto, and/or their family dependents who are
seeking employment opportunities in the coal industry, in coal-related industries or in any other vocation, trade or employment opportunity of the applicant's choosing. The decision to make an
assistance grant to an eligible applicant, the form of the grant and
the amount of each assistance grant shall be determined by the Fund's
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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Trustees at their sole discretion. Grants may be renewed annually
according to rules adopted by the Fund's Trustees.
Section 3. Administration
The UMWA-BCOA Training and Education Fund shall be jointly
administered by two Trustees, one of whom shall be appointed by
the UMWA and one of whom shall be appointed by the BCOA.
The Trustees shall be responsible for adopting all necessary rules
for the distribution of training and education monies, establishing
separate accounts, accounting for all monies owed to or received by
the Fund, providing a full accounting of the Fund's monies in May
and November of each year to the Presidents of the UMWA and
BCOA and all other action necessary for the proper and efficient
operation of the Fund. The salaries and expenses of the Trustees
and all administrative costs shall be the responsibility of the Fund.
The parties intend that maximum funds be used for training and
education purposes. The UMWA will supply, at no cost to the Fund,
office space for the administration of the Fund. Nothing herein shall
preclude receipt of monies from other sources for purposes consistent with the Fund.
Section 4. Funding
(a) Each signatory Employer shall contribute to the Fund referred
to in this Article 4.0 cents per hour actually worked by each of the
Employer's Employees who perform classified work as defined by
this Agreement in the first two years of this Agreement and 5.0
cents per hour actually worked commencing in the third year of this
Agreement and continuing through the term of the Agreement.
(b) The obligation to make payments to the Fund specified in
this Article shall become effective on the effective date of this Agreement, and the first payments are to be made on the 10th day of
March 1988 (which will include payment form the effective date
through the end of February, 1988) and thereafter continuously on
the 10th day of each succeeding calendar month.
(c) It shall be the duty of each of the Employers signatory hereto
to keep current said payments due to the Fund and to furnish to
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/6
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the International Union, United Mine Workers of America, and to
the Trustees of the Fund, a monthly statement showing on a mineby-mine basis, the full amounts due hereunder and the hours worked
with respect to which the amounts are payable. Payments to the
Fund shall be made by check payable to the "UMWA-BCOA Training and Education Fund."
(d) Payments shall be delivered or mailed to the Office of the
UMWA-BCOA Training and Education Fund currently located at
900 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 or as otherwise
designated by the Trustees of the Fund.
(e) Failure of any employer signatory hereto to make full and
prompt payments to the Fund specified in this article in the manner
and on the dates herein provided shall be deemed a violation of the
Agreement. This obligation of each Employer signatory hereto, which
is several and not joint, to so pay such sums shall be a direct and
continuing obligation of said Employer and it shall be deemed a
violation of this Agreement, if any mine, preparation plant or other
facility to which this Agreement is applicable shall be sold, leased,
subleased, assigned or otherwise disposed of for the purpose of
avoiding any of the obligations hereunder.
(f) Each Employer agrees to give proper notice to the President
of the appropriate local union by the 18th day of each month that
the Employer has made the required payment to the Fund for the
previous month, as required by this Article, or is delinquent in such
payment, such notice to set forth the amount paid to the Fund, or
the amount of delinquency and the hours worked with respect to
the mine or mines under the jurisdiction of such local union.
F.

Skills Training

Section 1. General
The parties recognize that technological changes are now occurring and may continue to occur in the coal industry. These technological changes may require new employee skills or the refinement
of existing employee skills in order for operations covered by this
Agreement to be safe and efficient. To keep pace with these techDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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nological changes, as required by the Employer, and to develop and
increase the skills of the classified work force and to enhance job
security the parties establish the UMWA-Employer Skills Training
Program.
Section 2. Purpose
As a demonstrated need arises at a mine or facility covered by
this Agreement, the Employer shall establish for such mine or facility
a Skills Training Program. The Skills Training Program would be
established to increase the efficiency of certain active classified Employees by enhancing or modifying existing skills or by developing
the new skills necessary regarding new machinery or other equipment
used in the course of the operation which has been modified or
improved by technology or has not before been utilized at the mine
or facility. Neither the program nor its implementation is in any
way intended to expand or diminish any work jurisdiction express
or implied under the Agreement. Neither will the program limit or
restrict in any way any rights of the Employer or the Union under
this Agreement.
Section 3. Skills Training Program
When new technology or improvements to existing technology
are introduced at any operation covered by this Agreement and new
skills are needed to utilize such new technology or improvements,
the Employer shall provide the appropriate active classified Employees whom it deems necessary with the skills training necessary
for the safe and efficient operation of the component, machine or
equipment introduced. The skills training may be performed at the
manufacturer's facility, at the Employer's training facility, on the
job, or at any other site appropriate for such training.
Each training program shall emphasize health and safety in addition to the other requirements of the job. Appropriate local and
district officials of the Union shall have the opportunity to review
each training program and make comments and suggestions.
Employees shall be paid at their regular straight time classified
rate for all time spent in skills training in accordance with the prohttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/6
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visions of this section, except when the overtime rate is required by
statute. In those cases where travel away from the work place or
overnight stay is required for the skill training the Employer and
the Local Union shall meet and establish the amount and the manner
in which expenses will be provided Employees for lodging and travel
associated with the Training Program.
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